We study single-good auctions when each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ ∈ (0, 1), known to the mechanism designer. The classical notions of implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undominated strategies are naturally extended to this setting, but their power is vastly different.
INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to design mechanisms guaranteeing high social welfare in auctions of a single good whose players are Knightian.
Knightian Players
In a traditional single-good auction, each player i is assumed to know his true valuation for the good, θi, exactly. The assumption, however, may be quite strong. For instance, can i be really sure that his true valuation is exactly $17,975 rather than -say-$18,001? If not, then how can his uncertainty be modeled?
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In an auction, however, from a strategic perspective a "Knightian player" could collapse each candidate distribution in his set to its expected value. Accordingly, without loss of generality, in a Knightian auction each player i only knows a set of integers, Ki, guaranteed to contain his true valuation θi. Therefore, Ki is "the set of all possible candidates for θi in i's mind", and will be referred to as i's candidate-valuation set.
Our Knightian Focus
Knightian players have received much attention in decision theory, or, almost equivalently, in mechanisms with a single player. We are instead interested in studying the competition of multiple Knightian players in full-fledged mechanisms. Transforming rich (i.e., exact or Bayesian) knowledge into optimal mechanisms is important. But equally important is to understand whether there are good mechanisms when the players only have set-theoretic knowledge about themselves. We must always understand what we can do "in the limit".
Specifically, we focus on Knightian auctions of a single good, adopting for simplicity sake a finite perspective. Namely,
• all valuations will be integers between 0 and a valuation bound B, and
• all mechanisms specify finitely many pure strategies for each player.
(Our results can however be extended to the general case as well.)
Knightian Mechanism Design
Intuitively, a mechanism cannot perform well in a Knightian setting where the candidate-valuation sets Ki are too "spreadout", but it might when they are sufficiently "clustered". Accordingly, we believe that performance should be measured as a function of the "inaccuracy" of the players' knowledge. Measuring inaccuracy. For a candidate-valuation set Ki of a player i, we set
Then, it is immediately seen that δi ∈ [0, 1] and that, because θi ∈ Ki, "player i knows θi to within a multiplicative factor of δi".
We refer to δi as i's individual inaccuracy (about his internal knowledge).
We define the (global) inaccuracy of a Knightian setting to be δ def = maxi δi. A setting is Knightian if δ > 0 and traditional if δ = 0. (If c ∈ R and α ∈ [0, 1], then we may call [c − αc, c + αc] a α-interval with center c. Any set contained in a α-interval will be called α-approximate.) Designer knowledge. To study auction mechanisms in a Knightian setting we must specify what information is available to the designer.
In a Bayesian setting, where the true valuation profile is drawn from a common prior distribution D, it is traditionally assumed that D itself is known to the designer (and the players). In a Knightian setting, each player i knows a set of distributions {Di,1, . . . , D i,k }, which, as already observed, is equivalent to knowing the set of their expected values, Ki. So: how much of this information should the designer be allowed to know?
An extreme assumption is that he knows every Ki. A much weaker assumption is that he knows all individual inaccuracies, but not any candidate-valuation set Ki. A yet weaker assumption is that he knows only the maximum individual inaccuracy. This is the assumption we choose to work under: namely, when designing an auction mechanism for Knightian setting, the designer only knows the global inaccuracy parameter δ.
Performance. Being in a tough set-theoretic setting, we adopt a worst-case analysis for evaluating the social welfare performance of an auction mechanism M . Figurately speaking, we envisage the following process. First, an auction mechanism M is announced for selling a given good to n Knightian players, where each player i privately knows his own candidate-valuation set Ki. Then -aware of K def = K1 × · · · × Kn and M , and intending to fool M -the devil secretly chooses a true-valuation profile θ ∈ K. After that, each player i chooses a strategy σi. (A player i may learn θi only after the auction is over or never, but during the auction acts based only on Ki.) Finally, M is played with strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) so as to produce a winner w = w(M, σ). Note that w is in general a random variable, since every σi may be mixed and M probabilistic.
The maximum social welfare of course is maxi θi; and the realized social welfare of M on σ is E[θ w(M,σ) ]. Informally speaking, the social welfare performance of M relative to K and σ is taken to be min θ∈K
. (Formally, of course, we must specify the solution concept "behind σ".) Objectives. In designing mechanisms in a Knightian setting we study and try to maximize their performance as a function of the global inaccuracy δ. In essence, δ is our chosen Trojan horse for bringing meaningful mechanism design in the Knightian setting. Without paying attention to the quality of the players' knowledge about themselves, one might design elementary mechanisms, but not "good" ones. Q&A.
• Multiplicative or additive accuracy? A greater level of generality is achieved by considering two distinct global inaccuracy parameters: a multiplicative one, δ * , and an additive one, δ + , leading to the following modified constraint: for all player i there exists xi ∈ R such that
All of our theorems hold for such a more general condition. For simplicity, however, we consider only one kind of global inaccuracy parameter, and we find the multiplicative one more meaningful.
• Can real δ's be really large? Absolutely. The players' candidate-valuation sets may indeed be "very approximate". Consider a firm participating to an auction for an exclusive license to manufacture solar panels in the US for a period of 25 years. Even if the demand were precisely known in advance, and the only uncertainty came from the firm's ability to lower its costs of production via some breakthrough research, a firm's individual inaccuracy about its own true valuation for the license could easily exceed 0.5.
Solution Concepts
The analysis of every mechanism requires an underlying solution concept. As Knightian settings are settings of incomplete information (i.e., settings whose players do not know exactly the true valuations of their opponents), two solution concepts naturally apply: implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undominated strategies. Of course, both solution concepts need to be properly extended to our setting, but this is naturally done (and in fact done in a way consistent with all prior works).
In essence, a pure strategy si of a player i is (very weakly) Knightian-dominant if it provides i with a utility at least as large as that of any other strategy ti of i, no matter what strategies his opponents may choose, and no matter what candidate in Ki may be i's true valuation. A pure strategy si of i is Knightian-undominated if i does not have any other strategy ti such that (1) ti gives i utility at least as great as si no matter what strategy subprofiles his opponents may use, and no matter what member of Ki may be i's true valuation and (2) ti gives i utility strictly greater than si for at least some strategy subprofile of his opponents and some member of Ki. (The set of such undominated strategies under a mechanism M is denoted by UDed 
INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF OUR RE-SULTS
How much social welfare can we guarantee in auctions? In traditional ones the answer is trivial: 100% in (veryweakly) dominant strategies, via the second-price mechanism. Things are quite different in Knightian auctions.
Meaningfulness but Inadequacy of DominantStrategy Mechanisms
Although a Knightian player "does not have a best valuation to bid", very-weakly-dominant strategies continue to be meaningfully defined in a Knightian auction. In a traditional auction the revelation principle (see [12] ) guarantees that, as far as very-weakly-dominant strategies are concerned, it suffices to consider mechanisms that restrict a player's strategies to (reporting) single valuations. It is easy to see, however, that a natural exentension of the revelation principle continues to apply in Knightian auctions. Specifically, if a very-weakly-dominant strategy mechanism M with a given social welfare performance guarantee exists, then there also exists a Knightian-direct mechanism M , with the same performance, where, for every player i, (1) his pure strategy set consists of reporting sets of valuations, and (2) truthfully reporting his own candidate-valuation set Ki is very-weakly dominant.
In principle, therefore, there may be a dominant-strategy mechanism that obtains all true candidate-valuation set, K1, . . . , Kn, and guarantees a high social welfare performance. Of course, given the inaccuracy of the players' knowledge of their own true valuations, one should expect some degradation of performance relative to the exact-valuation setting. However, one might conjecture that, in a Knightian auction with global inaccuracy δ, a dominant-strategy mechanism might be able to guarantee some δ-dependent fraction -such as (1 − δ), (1 − 3δ), or (1 − δ) 2 -of the maximum social welfare. We prove, however, that also such more modest hopes are too optimistic.
Theorem 1 (informal)
, no (possibly probabilistic) very-weakly-dominantstrategy-truthful mechanism M n,δ,B can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than
+ 1 B in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
As a relative measure of the quality of the players' self knowledge, δ should be independent of the magnitude of the players' valuations. But to ensure an upper bound on the players' valuations, B should be large. Accordingly, the above result essentially implies that any very-weaklydominant-strategy mechanism can only guarantee a fraction ≈ 1 n of the maximum social welfare. However, such a fraction can be trivially achieved by the "stupid" very-weaklydominant-strategy mechanism that, dispensing with all bids, assigns the good to a random player! Thus, Theorem 1 essentially says that no dominant-strategy mechanism can be smart: "the optimal one can only be as good as good as the stupid one". In other words, without some form of Bayesian knowledge, dominant strategies are intrinsically linked to the exact knowledge of our own valuations.
By showing the limitations of dominant strategies in Knightian auctions, Theorem 1 opens the door to alternative solution concepts: in particular, to implementation in undominated strategies. We actually believe that the Knightian setting will provide a new and vital role for this natural and non-Bayesian implementation notion.
The Power of Deterministic UndominatedStrategy Mechanisms
We tightly characterize the power of implementation in undominated strategies via deterministic mechanisms in Knightian auctions. First of all, without much difficulties, we show that the second-price mechanism (although no longer dominant-strategy) guarantees a relatively good fraction of the maximum social welfare in undominated strategies, despite the fact that it does not leverage any information about δ. Second, more importantly and perhaps more surprisingly, we prove that no deterministic undominated-strategy mechanism can do better, even with full knowledge of δ.
The (good) performance of the second-price mechanism.
Theorem 2 (informal).
In any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ, the second-price mechanism guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare that is
At high level, the intuition behind Theorem 2 is clear:
"It is obvious that each player i should only consider bidding a value vi inside his own candidate-valuation set Ki. It is further obvious that the worst possible gap between the maximum and the actual social welfare is achieved in the following case. Let w be the winner in the second-price mechanism, and let h, h = w, be the player with the largest candidate valuation. Player w bids vw = max Kw, and player h bids v h = min K h (and vw only slightly exceeds v h ). In this case it is obvious that the second-price mechanism guarantees at most a fraction ≈
1−δ 1+δ
2 of the maximum social welfare. "
Of course, things are a bit more complex. In particular, the fact that a player i should only consider bids in Ki (actually more precisely between min Ki − 1 and max Ki + 1) requires a proof.
The optimality of the second-price mechanism.
Theorem 3 (informal)
. For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B ≥ 1 δ , no deterministic undominated-strategy mechanism M n,B,δ can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than
in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
Theorem 3 is harder to prove, as to be expected from an impossibility result. Indeed, its statement applies to all undominated-strategy mechanisms, thus the revelation principle is no longer relevant. Thus, in order to prove Theorem 3, rather than analyzing a single mechanism (the "direct truthful" one), in principle we should consider all possible mechanisms. Considering only those where a player's strategies consist of valuations, or even sets of valuations, is not sufficient. We would have to consider mechanisms with arbitrary strategy sets. Establishing Theorem 3 thus requires new techniques, informally discussed in Section 3. 1 We note that when breaking ties at random, the performance of the second-price mechanism is only marginally better: namely, it guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare exactly equal to (
The Greater Power of Probabilistic Undominated-Strategy Mechanisms
The second-price mechanism "ignores the global inaccuracy parameter". It simply guarantees a fraction ≈ (
of the maximum social welfare in any Knightian auction, no matter what the value of δ happens to be. It is thus legitimate to ask whether knowing δ (or a close upper-bound to it) enables one to design mechanisms with a better efficiency guarantees. We prove that this is indeed the case: we explicitly construct a probabilistic mechanism that, by properly leveraging δ, outperforms the second-price mechanism, and then we prove that our mechanism is essentially optimal.
Theorem 4 (informal)
opt that guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare that is at least
Theoretical significance. Theorem 4 highlights a novelty of the Knightian setting: namely, probabilism enhances the power of implementation in undominated strategies even for guaranteeing social welfare. By contrast, probabilism offers no such advantage in the exact-valuation world, since the deterministic second-price mechanism already guarantees maximum social welfare. We conjecture that, in Knightian settings, probabilistic mechanisms will enjoy a provably better performance in other applications as well. Practicality. The proof of Theorem 4 is the technically hardest one in this paper. Nonetheless, we would like to emphasize that M (δ)
opt is very practically played, as it requires almost no computation from the players, and a very small amount of computation from the mechanism. In addition, its performance is practically preferable to that of the second-price mechanism. For instance, when δ = 0.5, M (δ) opt guarantees a social welfare that is at least five times higher that of the second-price mechanism when there are 2 players, and at least three times higher when there are 4 players.
If M (δ)
opt proves the power of probabilistic mechanisms, our next theorem upperbounds this power by proving that the social-welfare performance of M (δ) opt is essentially optimal among all mechanisms, probabilistic or not.
Theorem 5 (informal)
. For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B ≥ 1 δ , no (possibly probabilistic) undominated-strategy mechanism M n,δ,B can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than
In sum, our results prove that mechanism design in the Knightian setting is quite possible. While some of the old techniques no longer work, but yet it is still possible to explicitly construct good mechanisms.
TWO TECHNIQUES OF INDEPENDEN-T INTEREST
New ventures require new tools. Let us thus highlight two techniques, crucial to our present endeavor, that we believe will prove useful also to future work in Knightian mechanism design.
The Undominated Intersection Lemma. To prove Theorem 3 and Theorem 5, we establish a basic structural relation between candidate-valuation sets and undominated strategies. The simplest one of course would be UDedi(Ki) = Ki. This relation, however, is generally false, even when the strategies available to each player consist of individual valuations between 0 and B.
2 A second relation, implied by the previous one, is the following:
It is not clear, however, whether this second relation always holds.
3 Indeed, an undominated-strategy mechanism may have to specify its strategies sets in quite unforseen ways. Therefore, as soon as Ki and Ki are even slightly different, their corresponding UDedi(Ki) and UDedi( Ki) may in principle be totally unrelated. We prove, however, that the following simple variation of the second relation holds for any possible mechanism. Informally, For any mechanism, probabilistic or not, if Ki and Ki have at least two values in common, then there exist two (possibly mixed) "almost payoff-equivalent" strategies σi and σi respectively having UDedi(Ki) and UDedi( Ki) as their support.
This relation actually suffices for deriving all our impossibility results.
The Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma. To prove that a given social choice function can be implemented in undominated strategies we are happy to consider mechanisms using a restricted kind of strategies and allocation functions, but we must achieve a delicate balance. On one hand, these restrictions should ensure that the undominated strategies corresponding to a given candidate-valuation set can be characterized in a way that is both conceptually simple and easy to work with. On the other hand, they should be sufficient for proving our Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
Specifically, we consider mechanisms whose strategies consist of individual valuations (i.e., the pure strategies of each player coincide with {0, . . . , B}) and whose allocation functions are restrictions (to {0, . . . , B} n ) of integrable functions (over [0, B] n ) satisfying a suitable monotonicity property. A simple lemma, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma, then guarantees that, for all candidate-valuation set Ki, UDedi(Ki) = {min Ki, maxKi}.
2 Indeed a mechanism does not need to interpret a bid vi reported by i as i's true valuation θi. For instance, the mechanism could first replace each vi by π(vi) where π is some fixed permutation over {0, 1, . . . , B} and then run the second-price mechanism as if each player i had bid π(vi). In this case, after UDed(Ki) has been correctly computed, it will look very different from Ki. 3 It would actually hold if the total number of coins usable by the players for choosing their mixed strategies were upperbounded by a fixed constant.
Although concerned with undominated strategies, when specialized to the case of players knowing their valuations exactly, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma, is a strengthening of a classical lemma characterizing (very weakly) dominantstrategy-truthful mechanisms in traditional single-good auctions. Further, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma actually applies to all single-parameter domains, not just single-good auctions (the same way that the classical lemma does). We thus believe that this simple lemma will be useful beyond the immediate needs of this paper.
PRIOR WORK WITH KNIGHTIAN PLAY-ERS
As already mentioned, Knightian players have received a lot of attention in decision theory. In particular, [1] , [4] , [14] and [13] investigate decision with incomplete order of preferences.
The merits of different ways for a Knightian player to "condense" his set of possible values into a meaningfully and deterministically-chosen single value have been explored. For example, [3] studies the average, [8] the maximum, and [18] the Choquet expectation.
Other authors studied mechanisms where a single Knightian player is called to accept or reject a given offer; in particular [10] studied the rent-extraction problem in such a setting.
Less relevantly to our work, several authors have considered individual Bayesians to model a player's uncertainty: for instance, [17] , [15] , and [5] . Also, others have studied equilibrium models with unordered preferences: for instance [11] , [7] , [19] , and [6] . More recently, [16] characterize the set of equilibria in a financial market problem.
